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A continuous variable measurement device independent multi-party quantum communication pro-
tocol is investigated in this paper. Utilizing distributed continuous variable Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger state, this protocol can implement both quantum cryptographic conference and quantum
secret sharing. We analyze the security of the protocol against both entangling cloner attack and
coherent attack. Entangling cloner attack is a practical individual attack, and coherent attack is
the optimal attack Eve can implement. Simulation results show that coherent attack can greatly
reduce the secret key rate. Different kinds of entangled attacks are compared and we finally discuss
the optimal coherent attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum cryptography, to maximize secure trans-
mission distance and remove detector side attacks,
physicists use measurement device independent (MDI)
method [1], which has been experimentally realized [2].
In MDI quantum key distribution (QKD), anyone par-
ticipating the quantum communication connects to an
untrusted party, who is not a legitimate member in the
quantum communication. The secure communication re-
lies on the untrusted party’s measurement. So attacks
on measurement devices are moved from legitimate mem-
bers’ sides to the untrusted party’s side. Since any at-
tack on measurement devices can be transformed into
some attack in the channel followed by a correctly op-
erated measurement [3], we can just consider attacks in
the channels. One important realistic attack is entangling
cloner attack, which utilizes EPR state to maximize the
information Eve can steal in individual attack [4]. The
optimal attack Eve can implement, however, is not indi-
vidual attack, but coherent attack, where Eve uses the
ancillary system to globally interact with the signals and
finally makes an optimal joint measurement.
MDI multipartite quantum communication with long
distance is investigated in ref. [5]. This research is based
on discrete variable systems, while Gaussian modulation
and homodyne measurement [6] provide us another way
to realize MDI multipartite quantum communication in
continuous variable (CV) quantum systems. In this pa-
per, we use CV to investigate multi-party quantum cryp-
tography. CV MDI two-party quantum cryptography has
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been investigated in ref. [3]. Instead of using coherent
state and heterodyne measurement as ref. [3], our pro-
tocol utilizes squeezed state of light and homodyne mea-
surement to maximize the secret key rate. Hence the
main difficulty for the practical realization of our proto-
col is to generate squeezed state of light. Although it
is much more difficult than generating coherent state of
light, some experiments on CV squeezed states have been
done [7, 8], indicating that CV quantum communication
based on squeezed state can be realized in future.
We design and investigate two kinds of CV MDI multi-
partite quantum communication protocols in this paper.
One is quantum cryptographic conference (QCC) [9] and
the other is quantum secret sharing (QSS) [10]. QCC en-
ables each individual within a specific group to decrypt
the encrypted messages published by any group mem-
ber, whereas nobody outside the group can successfully
decrypt the secret messages. QSS enables an authorized
group of people to decrypt the secret messages by col-
laboration, but any unauthorized group of people fails to
decrypt the messages.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces the MDI multipartite quantum communication
protocols in detail. Section III analyzes the security of
this protocol against entangling cloner attack and co-
herent attack respectively for both QCC and QSS. Sec-
tion IV shows the numerical simulation of this protocol
against two kinds of attacks. Section V gives the conclu-
sion of this paper.
2II. PROTOCOLS OF MULTIPARTITE
QUANTUM COMMUNICATION
We are going to explain the details of the protocols for
both QCC and QSS in this section. Both of them rely on
the post-processed GHZ state, while the main difference
is within the postprocessing of classical data.
Before going into the detail of the protocol, we want to
first introduce CV Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)
state [11]. To implement these two kinds of multi-party
quantum communication protocols, we utilize CV GHZ
state, which is theoretically investigated [12] and exper-
imentally realized by linear optics [13, 14]. It is a mul-
tipartite entangled state whose uncertainties of relative
position and total momentum are squeezed. For tripar-
tite CV GHZ state, their positions and momenta sat-
isfy the relations: Xˆ1 − Xˆ2 → 0, Xˆ2 − Xˆ3 → 0 and
Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 + Pˆ3 → 0. CV GHZ state can be generated by
a series of beam splitters with particular transmittances
and squeezed vacuum states [15]. But in our protocol,
CV GHZ state is not prepared and distributed, whereas
is obtained by postprocessing using the idea of entangle-
ment swapping [16, 17]. The whole protocol of quantum
commincation is shown in Fig. 1.
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Two schemes of the protocol are shown in the follow-
ing. One is entanglement-based (EB) scheme and the
other is prepare-and-measurement (PM) scheme. In both
EB and PM schemes, Alice, Bob and Charlie are con-
nected with a fourth, untrusted person David and the
secure communication relies on David’s measurements.
It implies that both schemes are MDI multipartite quan-
tum communication protocols, which remove any detec-
tor side attack in Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s sides. We
introduce the EB scheme first, then the PM scheme.
Alice, Bob and Charlie prepare an EPR pair respec-
tively, which, in CV case, is a two-mode squeezed state
(TMSS) [18]. They hold one mode of the EPR pair in
their own possession and send the other mode to the
fourth, untrusted person David. Receiving three modes
from Alice, Bob and Charlie, David does the following op-
eration. The two modes from Alice and Bob go through
a beam splitter with transmittance 1√
2
. Then the posi-
tion quadrature XˆD of the output mode D is detected
by a homodyne measurement. The other output mode
is mixed with the mode from Charlie by another beam
splitter with transmittance
√
2
3 and the output modes
are denoted by E and F . The position quadrature XˆE
and the momentum quadrature PˆF are detected by two
homodyne measurements. David publishes the measure-
ment outcomes XD, XE and PF . To construct a GHZ
state, Bob and Charlie use these data to finish the dis-
placement operations on their own modes. Specifically,
Bob shifts the position quadrature XˆB1 with
√
2XD and
Charlie shifts the position XˆC1 and the momentum PˆC1
with
(√
1
2XD −
√
3
2XE
)
and
√
3PF respectively. After
that, Alice, Bob and Charlie own the modes A1, B3 and
C3 respectively and these three modes form a distributed
CV GHZ state. As for QCC scheme, they apply homo-
dyne measurements over the positions respectively, and
use the measurement outcomes XA1 , XB3 and XC3 to do
reconciliation and postselection. Since XˆA1 − XˆB3 → 0
and XˆB3−XˆC3 → 0, they can obtain coincident keys. As
for QSS scheme, they homodyne the momentum quadra-
tures respectively. At least two of the three must share
their measurement outcomes and do reconciliation and
postselection with the third person. Because of the re-
lation PˆA1 + PˆB3 + PˆC3 → 0, they can obtain the third
person’s secret key. In both QCC and QSS schemes, with
the random secret keys, they can use one-time pad [19]
to implement unconditional secure multipartite quantum
communication.
Now we introduce the equivalent PM scheme. Alice,
Bob and Charlie firstly generate Gaussian-distributed
random numbers respectively and keep these data pri-
vate. In QCC, Alice, Bob and Charlie do Gaussian mod-
ulation on position-squeezed vacuum states so that the
mean positions of the modulated squeezed states become
Gaussian-distributed random numbers XA, XB and XC .
In QSS, they do Gaussian modulation on momentum-
squeezed vacuum states so that the mean momenta of the
modulated squeezed states become Gaussian-distributed
random numbers PA, PB and PC . This preparation of a
Gaussian modulated squeezed state is equivalent to mak-
ing single-mode homodyne measurement over a TMSS.
This is because as for a TMSS, single-mode homodyne
3detection projects the other mode into a squeezed state
with a specific mean value related to the measurement
outcome. Then the Gaussian modulated squeezed states
are sent to the fourth, untrusted person David. David
mixes these three modes by two specific beam splitters,
makes homodyne measurements on the three outputs and
publishes the measurement outcomes, same as the EB
scheme. Bob and Charlie use the public data to post-
process their own data. In QCC, Alice remains her data
constant, Bob modifies XB as X
′
B = XB +
√
2XD and
Charlie modifies XC as X
′
C = XC+
(√
1
2XD −
√
3
2XE
)
,
so that their data satisfy the relation XA−X ′B → 0 and
X ′B −X ′C → 0. By doing reconciliation and postprocess-
ing, they can obtain the coincident keys for QCC. In QSS,
Alice and Bob remain their data unchanged and Char-
lie replaces PC with P
′
C = PC +
√
3PF , making their
data satisfy PA + PB + P
′
C → 0. Finally, two of them
share their private data with each other. By reconcilia-
tion and postprocessing, they can obtain the secret key
of the third person.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Now let’s investigate the security of this protocol for
both QCC and QSS schemes. The security of EB and
PM schemes are equivalent. Since in EB scheme, we can
use the method of purification to calculate the secret key
rate, we choose to analyze the EB scheme. Our security
analysis involves two kinds of attacks: one is entangling
cloner attack and the other is coherent attack.
In general, there can be any attack at the detector
side, i.e. at David’s side in Fig. 1. But any attack at
the detector side is equivalent to adding a specific attack
in the channel followed by a correctly operated measure-
ment device [3]. Thus we can assume that Eve’s attack
only exists in the channel and that David’s operation and
measurement data can be trusted.
A. Independent entangling cloner attack
In this subsection, we focus on independent entangling
cloner attack in each channel. As shown in Fig. 3, at
the beginning, Eve owns three independent EPR pairs,
i.e., three TMSS’s. He injects one mode of each pair into
the channel, through a beam splitter with transmittance
ηA(ηB , ηC), and stores the output mode of each beam
splitter, EˆA1 (B1,C1), and the other mode of each EPR
pair, EˆA2 (B2,C2) , in the quantum memory.
In QCC, we consider the case when Alice wants to send
her secret message to Bob and Charlie. To achieve this,
Alice needs to share secret keys with Bob and Charlie,
respectively, by implementing QKD. The secret key rate
can be defined as
KQCC = min{KAB,KAC}, (1)
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FIG. 3: (Color online) EB scheme against independent entan-
gling cloner attacks
where KAB is the secret key rate between Alice and Bob,
andKAC is the secret key rate between Alice and Charlie.
Two kinds of reconciliation methods lead to different
secret key rates. With reverse reconciliation,
KRRAB = βI(XA1 : XB3)− I(XA1 : XEA1 , XEA2),
KRRAC = βI(XA1 : XC3)− I(XA1 : XEA1 , XEA2).
(2)
With direct reconciliation,
KDRAB = βI(XA1 : XB3)− I(XB3 : XEB1 , XEB2),
KDRAC = βI(XA1 : XC3)− I(XC3 : XEC1 , XEC2).
(3)
At the righthand sides of Eqs. (2) and Eqs. (3), the
first term represents the mutual information between
the measurement data of XA1 and the measurement
data of XB3(C3) [20], and the second term denotes the
mutual information between the measurement data of
XA1(B3,C3) and the measurement data of XEA1(B1,C1) and
XEA2(B2,C2) . β is the reconciliation efficiency.
In QSS, we assume Charlie holds the secret key, and
Alice and Bob have to collaborate with each other to
obtain the secret key. The secret key rate can be defined
as
KRRQSS = βI(PA1 , PB3 : PC3)− I(PC3 : PEC1 , PEC2).
(4)
with reverse reconciliation, and
KDRQSS =βI(PA1 , PB3 : PC3)− I(PA1 : PEA1 , PEA2)
−I(PB3 : PEB1 , PEB2).
(5)
with direct reconciliation. At the righthand sides of
Eqs. (4) and Eqs. (5), the first term represents the mutual
information between the measurement data of PA1 and
the measurement data of PB3 and PC3 , and the second
term denotes the mutual information between the mea-
surement data of PA1(B3,C3) and the measurement data
of PEA1(B1,C1) and PEA2(B2,C2) .
To calculate the mutual information in Eqs. (2), (3),
(4) and (5), we need to obtain the covariance matrix of
4the whole state held by Alice, Bob, Charlie and Eve in
the following way.
At the beginning of this protocol, the initial whole
state ρA,EA,B,EB,C,EC is the tensor product of six inde-
pendent TMSS’s. Its covariance matrix is
VA,EA,B,EB ,C,EC =
3⊕
k=1
V, (6)
where
V =


V I
√
V 2 − 1Z 0 0√
V 2 − 1Z V I 0 0
0 0 VEI
√
V 2E − 1Z
0 0
√
V 2E − 1Z VEI

 .
(7)
V (V ≥ 1) is the variance of Alice’s (Bob’s, Charlie’s)
TMSS’s, VE (VE ≥ 1) is the variance of Eve’s TMSS’s, I
is identity matrix, 0 is zero matrix and Z is the Pauli Z
matrix.
In each channel, Alice’s (Bob’s, Charlie’s) mode goes
through a beam splitter with transmittance ηA(ηB , ηC).
The overall operation of these three beam splitters can
be written as
UEve = BSA
⊕
BSB
⊕
BSC, (8)
where
BSA(B,C) =


I 0 0 0
0
√
ηA(B,C)I
√
1− ηA(B,C)I 0
0 −√1− ηA(B,C)I √ηA(B,C)I 0
0 0 0 I

 .
(9)
At David’s side, the overall operation of the two beam
splitters is
UDavid = BS2BS1, (10)
where
BS1 =

 W1 W2 0−W2 W1 0
0 0 I

 ,BS2 =

 W3 0 W40 I 0
−W4 0 W3

 ,
W1 =


I 0 0 0
0
1√
2
I 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I

 ,W2 =


0 0 0 0
0
1√
2
I 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 ,
W3 =


I 0 0 0
0
√
2
3
I 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I

 ,W4 =


0 0 0 0
0
1√
3
I 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 .
(11)
Before any homodyne measurement, the whole state
becomes ρA1,F,EA1,EA2,B1,D,EB1,EB2,C1,E,EC1,EC2 with co-
variance matrix
VA1,F,EA1,EA2,B1,D,EB1,EB2,C1,E,EC1,EC2
=UDavidUEveVA,EA,B,EB ,C,ECU
T
EveU
T
David.
(12)
By permutating the modes in the covariance matrix in
Eq. (12) in the order of A1, B1, C1, Eve,D,E, F , we can
rewrite it in the form of
VA1,B1,C1,Eve,D,E,F =(
VA1,B1,C1,Eve,D,E C
C
T
VF
)
,
(13)
where the subscript Eve denotes all the six modes
EA1, EA2, EB1, EB2, EC1 and EC2, and C represents co-
variance submatrix.
Homodying PˆF turns the reduced covariance matrix
VA1,B1,C1,Eve,D,E into [21]
VA1,B1,C1,Eve,D,E|PF
=VA1,B1,C1,Eve,D,E −C
(
0 0
0 1
V (PˆF )
)
C
T ,
(14)
where V (PˆF ) is the variance of PˆF , given in the ma-
trix VF . As shown in Eq.(14), the covariance matrix
following partial homodyne measurement has nothing to
do with the measurement outcome. Thus, although the
measurement result may be different each time, the co-
variance matrix following the partial measurement re-
mains the same.
Iteratively calculating the covariance matrix of the
state after partial Gaussian measurements [6, 22], we
can obtain the covariance matrix of the partial state
ρA1,B1,C1,Eve after XˆD, XˆE and PˆF are homodyned.
Since displacement operations eiξXˆ and eiξ
′Pˆ re-
main the variances and covariances of Xˆ and Pˆ the
same, while only changes their mean values, the par-
tial state ρA1,B3,C3 owns the same covariance matrix as
ρA1,B1,C1|XD ,XE ,PF . Thus, by now, we have obtained the
covariance matrix of the state ρA1,B3,C3,Eve, denoted by
VA1,B3,C3,Eve.
Now we can calculate Eqs. (2), (3), (4) and (5) by using
VA1,B3,C3,Eve. In this calculation, we may need to obtain
the covariance matrix of a reduced state of ρA1,B3,C3,Eve
by using the formula similar to Eq. (14), when a partial
Homodyne measurement is applied.
The first terms at the righthand sides of Eqs. (2) and
(3) are given by
I(XA1 : XB3(C3)) =
1
2
log2
V (XˆB3(C3))
V (XˆB3(C3)|XA1)
, (15)
where V (XˆB3(C3)|XA1) is the conditional variance of
XˆB3(C3) after XˆA1 is homodyned and can be obtained
from the covariance matrix VB3C3|XA1 .
The second terms in Eqs. (2) and Eqs. (3) are
I(XA1(B3,C3) : XEA1(B1,C1) , XEA2(B2,C2))
=
1
2
log2
V (XˆA1(B1,C1))
V (XˆA1(B1,C1)|XEA1(B1,C1) , XEA2(B2,C2))
,
(16)
where V (XˆA1(B1,C1)|XEA1(B1,C1) , XEA2(B2,C2)) is the vari-
ance of XˆA1(B1,C1) after XˆEA1(B1,C1) and XˆEA2(B2,C2) are
5homodyned, and can be obtained from the reduced co-
variance matrix VA1(B3,C3)|XEA1(B1,C1) ,XEA2(B2,C2) . It is
the maximal mutual information between Eve’s measure-
ment data and Alice’s (Bob’s, Charlie’s) measurement
data. Because Eve can decrease V (XˆA1) most by homo-
dyning on XˆEA1 and XˆEA2 for reverse reconciliation, and
reduce V (XˆB3(C3)) most by homodyning on XˆEB1(C1) and
XˆEB2(C2) for direct reconciliation.
The first terms at the righthand sides of Eq. (4) and
Eq. (5) are
I(PA1 , PB3 : PC3) =
1
2
log2
V (PˆC3)
V (PˆC3 |PA1 , PB3)
. (17)
The second term in Eq. (4) is
I(PC3 : PEC1 , PEC2) =
1
2
log2
V (PˆC3)
V (PˆC3 |PEC1 , PEC2)
, (18)
which is the maximal mutual information between Eve’s
measurement data and Charlie’s measurement data with
reverse reconciliation. The second term in Eq. (5) is
I(PA1 : PEA1 , PEA2) + I(PB3 : PEB1 , PEB2)
=
1
2
log2
V (PˆA1)
V (PˆA1 |PEA1 , PEA2)
+
1
2
log2
V (PˆB3)
V (PˆB3 |PEB1 , PEB2)
,
(19)
which gives the maximal mutual information between
Eve’s measurement data and Alice’s and Bob’s measure-
ment data with direct reconciliation.
B. Coherent attack
In previous subsection, we analyze the security of our
protocol under individual entangling cloner attacks. But
this is not sufficient to show its unconditional security.
In this subsection, we investigate the security of our pro-
tocol against a more general attack, which is a coherent
attack within each time when Alice, Bob and Charlie
respectively send one qumode to David. Note that a
general coherent attack can be simplified to the coherent
attack in Fig. 4 under the assumption that Alice, Bob
and Charlie’s input states are respectively permutation-
ally symmetric [23].
Fig. 4 shows a coherent attack against our protocol.
Eve takes three qumodes out of his ancillary qumodes,
which is globally a pure Gaussian state, and inject them
into three channels through beam splitters, respectively.
The output states coming out of the beam splitters and
the remaining ancillary qumodes are all stored in Eve’s
quantum memory. After monitoring all the data in pub-
lic channels, Eve implements an optimal measurement on
these qumodes in the quantum memory to obtain maxi-
mal information.
We use the Holevo bound to quantify the amount of
information Eve can obtain. The secret key rate in QCC
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FIG. 4: (Color online) EB scheme against a coherent attack
protocol becomes
KRRAB = βI(XA1 : XB3)−H(ρEve : XA1), and
KRRAC = βI(XA1 : XC3)−H(ρEve : XA1),
(20)
where I(XA1 : XB3(C3)) has been given in Eq. (15),
and H(ρEve : XA1) = S(ρEve)−S(ρEve|XA1 ) denotes the
Holevo information between Eve’s quantum state and Al-
ice’s measurement data XA1 . Here we use S(ρ) to denote
the von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ. Since
Eve can purify the whole state ρA1,B3,C3,Eve, we have
H(ρEve : XA1) = S(ρA1,B3,C3)− S(ρB3,C3|XA1 ), (21)
For S(ρA1,B3,C3), we can calculate it from a function of
the symplectic eigenvalues ν1, ν2 and ν3 of the covariance
matrix VA1,B3,C3 .
S(ρA1,B3,C3) = h(ν1) + h(ν2) + h(ν3), (22)
where h(x) := x+12 log2
x+1
2 − x−12 log2 x−12 . For
S(ρB3,C3|XA1 ), we have
S(ρB3,C3|XA1 ) = h(ν4) + h(ν5), (23)
where ν4 and ν5 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the
covariance matrix VB3,C3|XA1 .
The secret key rate for QSS scheme is
KRRQSS = βI(PA1 , PB3 : PC3)−H(ρEve : PC3), (24)
where I(PA1 , PB3 : PC3) has been given in Eq. (32), and
H(ρEve : PC3) =S(ρEve)− S(ρEve|PC3 )
=S(ρA1,B3,C3)− S(ρA1,B3|PC3 ).
(25)
S(ρA1,B3|PC3 ) can be calculated from h(ν6)+h(ν7), where
ν6 and ν7 are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix VA1,B3|PC3 .
Both the secret key rates for QCC and QSS are func-
tions of the elements of the covariance matrix VA1,B3,C3
6and its reduced covariance matrix under partial homo-
dyne measurement. In the following, we show how to
obtain the covariance matrix VA1,B3,C3 .
At the beginning, the whole system is the tensor prod-
uct of Alice’s, Bob’s and Charlie’s TMSS’s and Eve’s
globally pure Gaussian state. Generally, up to local
Gaussian operation, the covariance matrix of Eve’s re-
duced state ρEA,EB ,EC in Fig. (4) can be given by
VEA,EB,EC =

 VA G1 G2G1 VB G3
G2 G3 VC

 , (26)
where
VEA = VEAI, VEB = VEBI, VEC = VEC I,
G1 =
(
g1 0
0 g′1
)
, G2 =
(
g2 0
0 g′2
)
,
and G3 =
(
g3 0
0 g′3
)
.
(27)
VEA , VEB and VEC are the variances of the thermal noise
Eve injects into each channel. g1, g2 and g3 represent
the correlations between the noises Eve adds into the
three channels. Then the covariance matrix of the whole
system can be written as
VA,B,C,Eve =
3⊕
k=1
V
′⊕
VEA,EB ,EC , (28)
where
V
′ =
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1Z√
V 2 − 1Z V I
)
. (29)
Permutate the modes in the covariance matrix
VA,B,C,Eve to make the order of the modes becomes
A,EA, B,EB, C,EC . Applying the conjugate unitary op-
eration on the covariance matrix VA,EA,B,EB ,C,EC , we
obtain the covariance matrix of the whole state includ-
ing the modes A1, B1, C1 and Eve’s modes, that is
UDavidUEveVA,EA,B,EB,C,ECU
T
EveU
T
David. (30)
Here the matrices UDavid and UEve are different from
those given in Eqs. (8),(9),(10) and (11). We must delete
the seventh and eighth rows and columns of the matri-
ces BSA(B,C) in Eq. (9) and W1(2,3,4) in Eq. (11), to
make the dimensions of the matrices UDavid and UEve
match VA,EA,B,EB,C,EC . Since we want to obtain the
covariance matrix VA1,B3,C3 , we delete the rows and the
columns corresponding to Eve’s modes in the covariance
matrix given by Eq. (30). Then we permutate the modes
in the order A1, B1, C1, D,E, F , obtaining the covariance
matrix VA1,B1,C1,D,E,F . Using the formula of reduced
covariance matrix following partial homodyne measure-
ment as shown in Eq. (14), we get the covariance ma-
trix VA1,B1,C1|XD ,XE ,PF . Since displacement operations
don’t change the covariance matrix, VA1,B1,C1|XD ,XE ,PF
is the covariance matrix VA1,B3,C3|XD,XE ,PF .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate both QCC and QSS
schemes against two kinds of attacks according with the
state-of-art technology. The simulation results show that
under independent entangling cloner attacks, the maxi-
mal transmission distances can be significantly enlarged
in the case of unbalanced LA, LB and LC . But under co-
herent attacks, the maximal transmission distances are
markedly reduced. By comparing different entangled at-
tacks, we finally find the optimal coherent attacks in
QCC and QSS.
A. Simulation for independent entangling cloner
attack
We can replace the transmittance of the beam splitter
in Fig. 3, with a realistic transmission distance in exper-
iment by using ηA (B,C) = 10
−αLA(B,C)10 , where LA(B,C)
is the transmission distance from Alice (Bob, Charlie)
to David, and α denotes the coefficient of loss in optical
fibers. In the following simulation, we set the coefficient
of loss α = 0.2dB/km.
Besides the transmission distances, the secret key rate
also depends on the variance of Alice’s (Bob’s, Charlie’s)
initial TMSS’s, V , the variance of Eve’s TMSS’s, VE and
the reconciliation efficiency β. According to the current
state-of-art experimental technology, we set V = 10 and
β = 0.95 in the following simulation. Since larger VE in-
dicates higher noise in the channel and lower uncertainty
for Eve’s estimation, we set VE = 1 for pure loss case,
VE = 2 for weak entangling cloner attack and VE = 5 for
strong entangling cloner attack in our simulation.
In QCC, we assume that the transmission distances
from Bob and Charlie to David are equal, i.e., LB = LC ,
while the transmission distance from Alice to David, LA,
is different from LB and LC . With reverse reconcili-
ation, when Alice is close to David, the transmittance
ηA = 10
−0.2LA10 approaches 1, so that little information
can be obtained by Eve from Alice’s measurement data.
So the secure transmission distance from Bob and Char-
lie to David can be significantly increased. Fig. 5 shows
the maximal transmission distances of LA and LB(C) sat-
isfying KRR
AB(AC) > 10
−3. With direct reconciliation, the
situation is opposite. To attain a high secret key rate,
Bob and Charlie must be close to David, while Alice can
be far away from David.
In QSS, we consider the case that LA = LB, but
LC is different from LA and LB. With reverse recon-
ciliation, when LC approaches zero, the transmittance
ηC = 10
−0.2LC10 gets close to 1, so that Eve can obtain
little amount of information from Charlie’s measurement
data. Hence, both the secure transmission distances LA
and LB are greatly enlarged as shown in Fig. 6. With di-
rect reconciliation, to keep the secret key rate high, Alice
can be far from David, but both Alice and Bob must be
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The maximal transmission distances
satisfying the condition KRRAB(AC) > 10
−3. The blue curve is
for the case VE = 1; the red curve is for the case VE = 2; the
black is for the case VE = 5.
close to David.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) The maximal transmission distances
satisfying the condition KRRQSS > 10
−3. The blue curve is for
the case VE = 1; the red curve is for the case VE = 2; the
black is for the case VE = 5.
The simulation results in both Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show
that imbalanced transmission distances of the three chan-
nels lead to further total maximal transmission distances
when Eve implements entangling cloner attack.
B. Simulation for coherent attack
To guarantee the matrix VEA,EB,EC in Eq. (26)
a valid covariance matrix, for any thermal noise
VEA , VEB , VEC ≥ 1, g1, g2 and g3 must satisfy the
bona-fide condition [24], that is ν2− ≥ 1, where ν−
is the smallest symplectic eigenvalue of the matrix
VEA,EB,EC . The symplectic eigenvalue spectrum of the
matrix VEA,EB,EC equals to the eigenvalue spectrum of
the matrix |iΩVEA,EB,EC |, where
Ω =
3⊕
k=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (31)
The secret key rates depend on the transmission dis-
tances, the variance of Alice (Bob, Charlie)’s TMSS’s, V ,
the thermal noise Eve injects in each channel, denoted by
VEA , VEB and VEC , the correlations between the noises
in the three channels, represented by g1, g2 and g3, and
the reconciliation efficiency β. Here we set V = 10 and
β = 0.95, same as above.
To minimize the secret key rate in Eq. (1), Eve only
needs to concentrate on attacking the communication ei-
ther between Alice and Bob, or between Alice and Char-
lie using the optimal “negative EPR attack”, which has
been defined in refs. [3, 25].
Another case, which has not been investigated before,
is that Eve intends to reduce the secret key rates KAB
and KAC simultaneously, such that Alice can securely
communicate neither with Bob, nor with Charlie. To do
this, one way for Eve is to apply symmetric attack in
Bob’s and Charlie’s channels, which means that inter-
changing ρEB and ρEC leaves Eve’s attack invariant, i.e.,
VEB = VEC and g1 = g2.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) The accessible values of g1(g2) and
g3 satisfying the bona-fide condition when VEA = VEB =
VEC = 2. The red region shows the values of g1(g2) and g3,
with which ρEA is bipartitely entangled with ρEB and ρEC
respectively. The green region shows the values of g1(g2) and
g3, with which ρEB and ρEC are entangled.
We find that the bona-fide condition in this symmetric
case becomes
4g21 + g
2
3 − V 2EA − V 2EC+√
8g21 [g
2
3 − (VEA − VEC )2] + (g23 + V 2EA − V 2EC )2 ≤ −2.
(32)
A numerical example of the accessible values of g1(g2)
and g3 satisfying the bona-fide condition is shown by the
colored region in Fig. 7. We divide this colored region
into three subregions by checking the separability of each
8two modes in their reduced states using the positive par-
tial transpose (PPT) criterion [26]. In the red region,
ρEA is entangled with ρEB and ρEC respectively. In the
green region, ρEB and ρEC are entangled. In the pink
region, ρEA , ρEB and ρEC are pairwise separable.
In the left red region, the fluctuations of XˆEA − XˆEB
and XˆEA−XˆEC are amplified. Injecting this kind of noise
results in the increase of the fluctuations of XˆA1 − XˆB3
and XˆA1 − XˆC3 . In the bottom green region, the fluc-
tuation of XˆEB − XˆEC is amplified. Injecting this kind
of noise makes the fluctuation of XˆB3 − XˆC3 increase.
For both cases, the secret key rate is declined. Referring
to the discussion in ref. [3, 25], the entanglement cor-
responding to the left red region and the bottom green
region is “bad” entanglement. Whereas, the entangle-
ment corresponding to the right red region and the top
green region helps increasing the key rate, which we call
“good” entanglement. To minimize the secret key rate,
Eve needs to maximize the “bad” correlation between the
noises in each channel. Thus, the optimal attack must
lie in the blue contour curve in Fig. 7.
We first compare two maximally entangled attacks
with the independent attack. The first entangled at-
tack corresponds to the left-most point in the red region,
where g1(g2) is minimized and g3 = 0. The second en-
tangled attack corresponds to the down-most point in
the green region, where g3 is minimized and g1 = g2 = 0.
The independent attack corresponds to the origin given
by g1 = g2 = g3 = 0. The simulation results of these
three attacks are given in Fig. 8. It indicates that entan-
gled attacks perform better than independent attack and
the attack with minimal g1(g2) and zero g3 is stronger
than the other two attacks.
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FIG. 8: (Color online) The maximal transmission distances
satisfying KRRAB(AC) > 0 when VEA = VEB = VEC = 2. The
blue curve is the attack with minimal g1(g2) and vanishing
g3. The red curve is the attack with minimal g3 and vanishing
g1(g2). The black curve is the attack with g1 = g2 = g3 = 0.
But the attack with minimal g1(g2) and zero g3 is not a
general optimal attack. For instance, in the case shown
by Fig. 9, when LA is short, the attack corresponding
to the dashed green curve performs better than the at-
tack with minimal g1(g2) and vanishing g3, shown by the
blue curve. We cannot give a universal optimal attack
strategy of g1(g2) and g3 for all the cases. The values of
g1(g2) and g3 to achieve optimal attack depend on the
transmission distance of each channel and the thermal
noise in each channel.
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FIG. 9: (Color online) The maximal transmission distances
satisfyingKRRAB(AC) > 0 when VEA = 1.5 and VEB = VEC = 3.
The blue curve is the attack with g1(g2) minimized and g3
vanishing; the red curve is the attack with g1(g2) vanishing
and g3 minimized; the dashed green curve is the attack, where
g1(g2) equals 2/3 times of its minimal value and g3 saturates
the bona-fide condition in Eq. (32).
In Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, we fix the thermal noise in each
channel to see the maximal transmission distances. Now
we fix the transmission distances to look at the maximal
tolerable thermal noise in each channel. Fig. 10 gives
the simulation when LA = 1 km and LB = LC = 3 km.
The simulation result indicates that the maximal tolera-
ble VEA and VEB(C) is markedly asymmetric.
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FIG. 10: (Color online) The maximal tolerable thermal noises
satisfying KRRAB(AC) > 0 when LA = 1 km and LB = LC =
3 km. The blue curve is the attack with g1(g2) minimized
and g3 vanishing; the black curve is the attack with g1(g2)
vanishing and g3 minimized; the dashed green curve is the
attack, where g1(g2) equals half of its minimal value and g3
saturates the bona-fide condition in Eq. (32).
For QSS, we consider the symmetric case where the
transmission distances of Alice’s and Bob’s channels are
equal, LA = LB, and that the attacks in Alice’s and
9Bob’s channels are the same, VEA = VEB and g2 = g3. It
implies that after Charlie distributes the secret to Alice
and Bob, both of them can obtain the same amount of
information about the secret.
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FIG. 11: (Color online) The accessible values of g1 and g2(g3)
satisfying the bona-fide condition when VEA = VEB = VEC =
2. The red region shows the values of g1 and g2(g3), with
which ρEC is entangled with ρEA,EB . The blue region shows
the values of g1 and g2(g3), with which ρEC and ρEA,EB are
separable.
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FIG. 12: (Color online) The maximal transmission distances
satisfying KRRQSS > 0 when VEA = VEB = 2 and VEC = 3. The
blue curve is the attack with minimal g2(g3) and vanishing g1;
the red curve is the attack with vanishing g2(g3) and minimal
g1; the black curve represents independent attack with g1 =
g2 = g3 = 0.
A numerical example of the accessible values of g1 and
g2(g3) is shown in Fig. 11. By using the PPT criterion,
we divide the colored region further into two subregions.
ρEC and ρEA,EB are separable in the blue region and
entangled in the red region. For the entangled states in
the left red region, the fluctuations of PˆEA + PˆEC and
PˆEB + PˆEC are simultaneously amplified, which makes
the fluctuation of PˆA1 + PˆB3 + PˆC3 increase. So it is
“bad” entanglement, helping Eve to decrease the secret
key rate. Whereas the entanglement in the right red
region is “good” entanglement, helping to increase the
secret key rate. For any VEC and VEA(VEB ), the optimal
attack corresponds to the attack with minimal g2(g3) and
vanishing g1, which indicates that ρEC and ρEA,EB are
maximally entangled.
We compare the optimal attack with other two attacks.
One is the independent attack given by g1 = g2 = g3 = 0.
The other is the attack with minimal g1 and vanishing
g2(g3), in which ρEA and ρEB form an EPR pair and
ρEC is independent. Fig. 12 shows the maximal trans-
mission distances of LA(B) and LC under these three at-
tacks when VEA = VEB = 2 and VEC = 3. It’s easy to
see that the attack with minimal g2(g3) performs better
than the other two attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates CV MDI multipartite quan-
tum communication, where detector side attacks are re-
moved from the side of each party participating the quan-
tum communication. Our protocol can implement both
QCC and QSS. The security against entangling cloner
attack and coherent attack is analyzed respectively. Un-
der entangling cloner attack, the maximal transmission
distances can be significantly enlarged in the case of un-
balanced distribution. Compared with entangling cloner
attack, coherent attack reduces the maximally transmis-
sion distances markedly. Finally, we study the optimal
coherent attacks in QCC and QSS respectively.
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